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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030677CA

v.
JAMES ANDREW NARANJO,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
first degree felony (R. 100). This court has jurisdiction over
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that a citizen's

call to the police, reporting an Hispanic male wearing a red
jacket looking into car windows in a quiet parking lot, combined
with the officer's observation of just such a person riding a
bike across campus with a metal bar extending out of his back
pocket created the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain the
suspect?

2.

Was the officer justified in conducting a Terry frisk

where defendant's ongoing behavior was aggressive and agitated
and where he refused to comply with the officer's repeated
requests to stop and show his hands?
"[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness [.]"
932, 939 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

This standard, however, "conveys a measure

of discretion to the trial judge," falling short of a de novo
review.
3.

Id.
Did the officer conduct a proper Terry frisk when he

lifted defendant's pant leg to check for weapons, where defendant
was actively resisting the frisk, making it difficult for the
officer to safely reach down to pat the ankle area?
The standard of review articulated in State v. Pena, above,
also applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.

-2-

The Utah statute granting peace officers the authority to
frisk suspects for dangerous weapons provides:
A peace officer who has stopped a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk the
person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is
in danger.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor (R. 1-2).
14-18).

Defendant filed a suppression motion (R.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R.

112: 23). Defendant proceeded to trial (R. 113).

The

misdemeanor charge was dismissed, and a jury convicted defendant
of the first degree felony (R. 50). The trial court sentenced
defendant to five years to life in the Utah State Prison with
credit for time served (R. 100-01).

Defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal, and the case was poured over from the Utah
Supreme Court to this Court (R. 103; addendum A ) .

-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On a quiet Sunday afternoon between semesters in January of
2003, while on security patrol at Weber State University, Officer
Valentine received a call from dispatch, reporting that "an
individual had called in from the Social Science Building . . .
and reported seeing a Hispanic male wearing a red type of jacket
or coat that was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot" (R.
113: 18) .2

Officer Valentine left the building he was checking

and immediately noticed a male matching the description riding
his bicycle across a parking lot (Id. at 22).
The officer got in his marked police vehicle and followed
the individual - defendant - up a small access road (Id.).

When

he caught up with defendant, the officer "pulled up behind him
and followed him for a short distance, 10, 15 feet and tooted my
horn to let him know I was behind him" (Id. at 23-24).
looked over his shoulder and stopped his bike.

Defendant

Officer Valentine

exited his vehicle and "said something to the effect of I need to
talk to you or can I talk to you for a minute" (Id. at 24).

In

1

The facts are essentially undisputed, based on the
testimony of Officer Valentine. The only other trial witnesses
were the backup officer, who arrived after the central events had
already transpired, and a state criminalist, whose testimony was
limited to identification of the contraband as heroin. See R.
113: 68-76, 77-93.
2

At trial, Officer Valentine recalled seeing someone riding
a bicycle who matched this description when he first arrived on
campus at about 7:45 that morning (Id. at 21).

-4-

response, defendant "gestured in a southwesterly direction and
said that I'm just riding over here . . . and began to peddle
away" (Id.).
Officer Valentine got back in his car and followed defendant
up a hill.

He observed that defendant was holding the handlebar

of the bicycle with one hand and talking on a cell phone with the
other (Id. at 25). The officer also observed "what appeared to
be a metal type of bar or object extending out of his rear back
pocket" (IcL.) .
Defendant was riding in the wrong lane of a two-lane road
divided by a yellow line (Id. at 26). Accordingly, the officer
looked down to activate his lights as a warning to anyone else
who might be coming in the opposite direction (Id. at 26, 57).
When he looked up, defendant had dropped his bicycle on the
roadway and was approaching the officer's vehicle "in an angry,
aggressive manner" (Id. at 27). The officer particularly noted
defendant's "constant staring eye contact" and the "deliberate
manner" in which he walked toward the police vehicle while still
talking on the cell phone (Id. at 28). As defendant approached
the passenger side of the stopped police car, he put his hand in
a front pocket and then took it out again.

The officer testified

that defendant "appeared to be palming something from my view"
(Id.).

While the officer could not be sure what, if anything,

defendant was holding, he was concerned that it might be a weapon
(Id. at 28-29).
-5-

Now out of his vehicle, the officer spoke to defendant over
his car, ordering him to step around to the front of the car and
show him what was in his hand (Id. at 29).

Defendant's response

was loud, aggressive, and unintelligible (Id.).
defendant moved to the front of the car

Eventually,

xx

[i]n that same

deliberate fast-paced walk" while the officer again ordered him
to show his hand (Id. at 30).

Rather than stopping at the front

as directed, however, defendant continued on around the car
towards the officer (Id. at 31). Not knowing defendant's
intentions, seeing that defendant was not following his
directions, and wary about defendant's ongoing aggressiveness,
Officer Valentine drew his weapon and hung it down behind his leg
(Id. at 32). When even this failed to stop defendant, the
officer raised the weapon, pointed it at defendant, and again
ordered him to stop (Id. at 33).
Defendant stopped in his tracks about 5 to 6 feet away from
the officer, tossed the item from his hand, and then began
emptying his pockets on the ground, shouting,

N>>

Do you want to

see what's in my pockets? I'll show you what I've got, this is
what I've got'" (IdL. at 35).
With undiminished apprehension about defendant's conduct,
the officer ordered defendant to the ground.

When defendant

stopped throwing things from his pockets, he complied (Id. at
36).

Officer Valentine handcuffed defendant, helped him up to

-6-

his feet, and walked him to within 6 or 8 inches of the police
car to frisk him for weapons (Id. at 37, 39).
Officer Valentine described defendant as leaning towards the
police car, ''pushing his hips into the rear quarter panel of my
police car to prevent me from patting his front area, the
waistband and pocket area" (Id. at 37). As the officer tried to
frisk defendant, "[defendant] was trying to get [his hands]
around to the side to the front area and he appeared to be
digging in his waistband or trying to get into a pocket in the
front" (Id^_ at 38) .
Working to forcibly control defendant's handcuffed hands by
pulling them back towards the center of his body and holding them
there, Officer Valentine "couldn't safely reach down and grab his
ankle and feet" at the same time to frisk that area of his body
(Id. 40). Accordingly, the officer "lifted up the pant leg to
visually inspect the sock area" (Id.).

When he did so, a bindle

fell to the ground (Id.).
As defendant continued to resist, Officer DeHart arrived to
help (Id. at 43, 72). 3 In order to control the struggling
defendant, Officer Valentine took him to the ground by force, at
which point Officer DeHart took over (Id. at 45).

Officer

Valentine then began collecting the items defendant had thrown,

3

Officer Valentine had called dispatch for back-up when he
first ordered defendant to move to the front of the patrol car
(R. 113: 43)
-7-

including a 13-inch black metal pry bar, a screwdriver, and a
metal file (Id. at 46-47).

When the officer picked up the

bindle, defendant volunteered, "That's heroin," and told the
officer he was a middleman, delivering the drug to someone at a
nearby Chevron station (Id. at 47). He stated that he had the
pry bar with him in case the individual to whom he was delivering
the drugs became aggressive (Id. at 48) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to stop and
detain defendant as he was riding away on his bicycle.

First,

defendant matched the description provided by the citizen who
called the police with a report of someone peering into cars in a
quiet parking lot.

Second, the officer personally saw a metal

bar sticking out of defendant's back pants pocket as he rode
away.

The fair inference from these facts is that defendant may

reasonably have been suspected of using the metal bar to break
into cars in the parking lot.

Alternatively, defendant was

violating the motor vehicle code, to which bicyclists are bound,
by riding on the wrong side of the road and was also subject to a
lawful stop based on this violation.
The officer also had reasonable suspicion to frisk
defendant.

Defendant was acting aggressively and yelling

unintelligibly, he appeared to pull something from his pocket
that the officer feared might be a weapon, and he refused to
comply with the officer's repeated instructions to stop and show
-8-

his hands.

Considering defendant's agitated conduct and having

no assurance that defendant was unarmed, the officer was
objectively warranted in the belief that his safety was in
danger.
Finally, the officer did not exceed the limits of a Terry
frisk for weapons when he lifted the leg of defendant's pants to
visually inspect the sock area.

Defendant's ongoing struggle to

keep the officer away from his waist area created the situation
necessitating the officer's action.

Had defendant stood quietly

as directed, the officer would have been able to conduct the
frisk as defendant now claims he would have preferred.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A CITIZEN'S CALL TO THE POLICE
REPORTING A HISPANIC MALE WEARING A
RED JACKET LOOKING INTO CAR WINDOWS
IN A QUIET PARKING LOT COMBINED
WITH THE OFFICER'S PERSONAL
OBSERVATION OF JUST SUCH A PERSON
RIDING A BIKE ACROSS CAMPUS WITH A
METAL BAR EXTENDING OUT OF HIS BACK
POCKET CREATED THE REASONABLE
SUSPICION NECESSARY TO DETAIN
DEFENDANT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining
that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to detain him.
Defendant contends that the undisputed facts simply do not
provide the quantum of evidence necessary to establish reasonable
suspicion.

See Br. of Aplt. at 16-18.

-9-

The officer in this case stopped defendant twice: once when
he honked briefly at him initially and again moments later when
he turned on his overhead lights (R. 113 at 23-24, 26-27).

The

trial court properly determined that the first stop was a level
one voluntary encounter and that the second stop was a level two
detention supported by reasonable suspicion.

See R. 113 at 23-

24 or addendum B.
The standard for initially detaining an individual is well
settled in Utah.

An officer is permitted to stop an individual

when "he has a reasonable suspicion to believe [the individual]
has committed or is in the act of committing . . .
offense."

a public

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999); see. also State v.

Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Carpena, 714
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986).

In determining whether reasonable

suspicion exists to temporarily detain a defendant, courts look
to "specific and articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, which warrant the intrusion."
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).

State

If reasonable

suspicion exists, the officer "has not only the right but the
duty to make observations and investigations to determine whether
the law is being violated; and if so, to take such measures as
are necessary in the enforcement of the law."

State v.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980) (quoting State v.
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971
(1977)) .
-10-

The reasonable suspicion determination turns on the totality
of the circumstances confronting the officer.
937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997).

State v. Humphrey,

In considering whether the

circumstances meet the threshold for reasonable suspicion, the
appellate court "accord[s] deference to an officer's ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."

United

States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001), cert,
denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002); accord State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d
506, 509 (Utah App. 1989)("experienced officers may be

A

able to

perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be
wholly innocent to the untrained observer'") (citation omitted).
Thus, "even ambiguous behavior, susceptible to an innocent
interpretation, may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity depending on the totality of the
circumstances."

Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir.

2000)(citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968)).

Indeed,

where defendant's conduct is "conceivably consistent with
innocent . . . activity" but is also "strongly indicative" of
criminal activity, Utah appellate courts will not hesitate to
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists.

Menke, 787 P.2d at

541.
In this case, a professor working in the social science
building called the police to report that an Hispanic male
wearing a red coat or jacket was looking into cars in a quiet
parking lot on a Sunday afternoon (R. 113: 18). The fair
-11-

inference from the objective fact that the caller contacted the
police is that he perceived the activity to be suspicious and
thought it ought to be investigated.

From even a layperson's

point of view, looking into multiple cars in a deserted parking
lot is simply not a normal activity.

Cf. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 509

(untrained observers may deem conduct innocent that a trained
officers would interpret differently).
Officer Valentine responded to the call from dispatch (Id.
at 18). Almost immediately, he spotted an individual riding a
bike across campus who matched the description.

The officer

followed him in his patrol vehicle and initiated a level one
voluntary encounter by pulling up behind him and briefly honking
his horn (Id. at 23). As was his right, defendant declined this
voluntary encounter and rode away.

He was free to leave and, in

fact, left (Id. at 24). The law is well-settled that as long as
a person "remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and
objective justification."

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.

544, 554 (1980).
Thereafter, the officer continued to observe defendant.

At

this juncture, he noticed a metal bar extending out of
defendant's rear pants pocket (Id. at 25). A fair inference from
this fact, considered in conjunction with the earlier
observations and report from the citizen who called the police,
-12-

is that defendant was carrying a tool with which to break into
cars.

See State v, Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah App.

1994)(conduct observed or information relied upon need not be
illegal to give rise to reasonable suspicion).

At this point,

the officer detained defendant, prompting the pivotal inquiry:
xx

[W] ould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the

seizure . . . ^warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate?"

Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
The answer is plainly "yes."

With the observation of the

metal bar added to the citizen report, the officer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that a crime may have been committed and
that defendant may have committed it.

In addition, defendant was

in violation of the state motor vehicle code, a further
justification for the stop.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-

84(1)(1999)(providing that, with certain exceptions, persons
operating bicycles are subject to motor vehicle laws); § 41-6-53
(1999)(articulating duty to operate motor vehicles on right side
of roadway).

The officer, therefore, was duty-bound to further

investigate the situation.
(citation omitted).
overhead lights.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 105

Accordingly, the officer activated his

Coming after defendant's previous rejection of

a voluntary encounter with the officer, the activation of the
lights constituted a show of authority, signaling to defendant
that he must stop and was not free to leave.
-13-

Cf. State v. Moqen,

52 P.3d 462 (Utah App. 2002) (defendant not free to leave where
officers left overhead lights on after returning driver's
license).
Because the undisputed facts established the quantum of
evidence necessary to establish reasonable suspicion, Officer
Valentine acted within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment when he
detained defendant.

Defendant's claim to the contrary is without

merit.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S ONGOING AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOR AND REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH
THE OFFICER'S REPEATED REQUESTS
JUSTIFIED THE TERRY FRISK FOR
WEAPONS
Defendant argues that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to frisk him for weapons.

See Br. of Aplt. at 18-22.

This argument fails on the undisputed record facts.
Both statutory and case law make clear that an officer may
conduct a weapons frisk on an individual who has been properly
stopped if the officer reasonably believes that he or anyone else
is in danger.

See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("The officer

need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger"); accord State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293
(Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999).

The officer's reasonable belief
-14-

must, of course, be supported by "specific and articulable facts"
as well as the "rational inferences" that may be drawn from those
facts.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

"Since no one factor is

determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine the
reasonableness of a frisk in light of all the facts."

Carter,

707 P.2d at 659; accord State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141
(Utah App. 1997) (articulating totality of the circumstances
test).
In this case, the officer was confronted with a suspect who
was aggressively striding towards him, making "constant staring
eye contact" and yelling unintelligibly (R. 113: 27-29).

As

defendant approached the officer's vehicle, he put his hand in
his pocket and then immediately withdrew it.

He appeared to be

"palming something" out of the officer's view, which the officer
feared might be a weapon (Id, at 28). The officer ordered
defendant at least twice to step around to the front of the
vehicle and show his hands.

At least twice, defendant ignored

the order and continued his angry and aggressive approach (Id. at
29-30, 32). The officer was concerned enough for his own safety
to draw his weapon, at first holding it down behind his leg but
ultimately needing to point it directly at defendant to compel
him to stop (Id. at 32-33).

While defendant then began emptying

his pockets, the officer had no idea if defendant had discarded
everything that might be a danger to him from the pockets (Id. at
34-36).

Under these circumstances, a reasonably prudent person
-15-

would most certainly "be warranted in the belief that his safety
. . . was in danger."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

No more is

necessary to justify a Terry frisk.

POINT THREE
THE OFFICER CONDUCTED A PROPER
TERRY FRISK WHEN HE LIFTED
DEFENDANT'S PANT LEG BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS ACTIVELY RESISTING
THE FRISK AND THE OFFICER COULD NOT
SAFELY REACH DOWN TO PAT THE ANKLE
AREA FOR WEAPONS
Defendant contends that the officer exceeded the ambit of a
proper Terry frisk by lifting one of his pant legs to check for
weapons (Br. of Aplt. at 23).

In defendant's view, this action

exceeded the limited inspection of a suspect's outer clothing
authorized by Terry and instead constituted a search requiring
probable cause (Id. at 24). 4
Defendant's argument fails because he reads Terry too
narrowly.

Terry "is not authority for the proposition that an

officer who has effectuated an investigatory stop of a

4

While a frisk in its most common form consists of a quick
pat-down of outer clothing, the Terry court itself recognized
this "apt description" of a frisk: "^[T]he officer must feel with
sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A
thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits,
waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and
entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at
17 n.13 (citation omitted). This description emphasizes the need
for officers to frisk in a sufficiently thorough manner to ensure
that they and those nearby will be protected from any weapons a
suspect may be hiding.
-16-

potentially armed individual is necessarily limited, under
circumstances, to conducting a pat-down."

all

Haves v. State, 414

S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. App. 1991)(emphasis in original); cf.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983) ("Terrv need not be
read as restricting the preventative search to the person of the
detained suspect"); U.S. v. Thomson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10 Cir.
2003)(Terry rationale "not necessarily limited to a frisk of the
person under investigation").

Rather, as noted by the U.S.

Supreme Court, Terry "held that there ^is no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.'" Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046 (quoting Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21
(citation omitted)).

When, as in this case,

the officer has a reasonable belief "that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and
dangerous to the officer or others, it would
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures
to determine whether the person is in fact
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm."
Id. at 1047 (citing Terrv, 392 U.S. at 24).
The trial court understood the flexibility inherent in a
Terrv frisk when it ruled that the frisk in this case was lawful:
During the kind of stand-up part of the
frisk, [defendant] tries to keep the officer
from patting down his front waistband and
pocket area of his jeans and the officer is
still trying to see what's in [his] hand.
And the officer testifies that he couldn't
bend over safely to pat the pant leg because
-17-

he's holding [defendant's] handcuffed hands
with one hand and he can't reach to his ankle
area to pat down so he lifts up his pant leg.
To me that seems reasonable and it seems to
be in conformity with what Terry is trying to
do and to avoid. It seems to me that's
reasonable given all of these circumstances
I've just described.
R. 112: 25-26.
The trial court's ruling is correct.

The "sole purpose" for

allowing an officer to conduct a Terry frisk "is to protect the
officer and other prospective victims by neutralizing potential
weapons."

State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36 $13, 78 P.3d 590 (citing

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) and Terry, 392 U.S. at
24).

Certainly, a proper Terry frisk "must be strictly ^limited

to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.'"
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300 59, 77 P.3d 646.

State v.

But whether a frisk

is reasonable always involves an objective assessment of all of
the circumstances facing the officer.

Id. (citing Terry, 392

U.S. at 21).
Thus, in Terry, the officer approached defendant, grabbed
him, and quickly patted him down.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.

Defendant did not resist in any way, allowing the officer to
complete the frisk with minimal intrusion.

Under these

circumstances, the court determined that a pat-down of
defendant's outer clothing struck the appropriate balance between

-18-

the officer's need to search for weapons and the defendant's
interest in bodily integrity.
This case presents a markedly different set of
circumstances.

Rather than cooperating, defendant here resisted

the frisk from the outset, pushing his hips towards the police
car and forcing his hands around from his back, where they were
handcuffed, to the side of his waist area (R. 113 at 37-38).
Defendant's intentional actions hindered the officer from quickly
and effectively completing the frisk.

Indeed, he created a

situation in which the officer was compelled to simultaneously
control defendant's physical movements and frisk him for weapons.
Under these circumstances, where the officer could not
easily or safely reach down to pat defendant's ankle area for
weapons, he instead briefly pulled up one of defendant's pant
legs.

While this movement was minimally more intrusive than

patting the ankle area, it was necessitated by defendant's own
refusal to quietly submit to a frisk.

_See Hayes, 414 S.E.2nd at

324 (where suspect resists frisk, officer may proportionately
respond to suspect's actions); see also Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (upholding seizure of gun from suspect's
waistband without prior frisk because suspect failed to comply
with officer's request to step out of car); State v. Warren, 603
P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1979) (where suspect pushed officer's hand
away during attempted risk, officer justified in reaching into
bulging pants pocket).

Moreover, the officer's conduct was
-19-

plainly more reasonable than the alternative - leaving the area
uninspected and the officer vulnerable to possible attack from a
secreted weapon.
Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the officer's
act of briefly lifting the leg of defendant's pants struck the
appropriate balance between "the need to search against the
invasion which the search entail[ed]."

Long, 463 U.S. at 1046

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Consequently, it constituted a
proper Terry frisk.
CONCLUSION
The stop of defendant was legal because the officer had
reasonable suspicion, based on a citizen report of suspicious
behavior and the officer' s observation of a potential burglary
tool in defendant's pocket, that defendant may have been
burglarizing vehicles in a deserted parking lot.

Alternatively,

the officer also personally observed defendant violating the
motor vehicle code.

The subsequent frisk was legal, based on

defendant's unpredictable, aggressive behavior and on his
repeated refusal to follow the officer's orders.

The scope of

the frisk was also permissible because it was directly
necessitated by defendant's ongoing resistance.

Because all of

the officer's actions preceding the discovery of the heroin were
lawful, the drugs are admissible.

Consequently, this Court

should affirm defendant's conviction for one count of possession
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of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first
degree felony.
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cause.

In fact, he didn't have a reasonable suspicion.

No

matter what the state says about Mr. Naranjo's behavior, he
testified at the time he decided to conduct the frisk he
had —

saw no bulges, had no facts to rely on to believe the

defendant at that time was presently armed and dangerous.
Without that, he can't even frisk him,
he testified to.

He saw no bulges.

cross-examination.

I think that's what

I went through that on

He said he had no —

nothing he could

point to make him believe the defendant at that time was
presently armed and dangerous.

So the frisk even —

even if

the pull up of the pant leg wasn't a search, he still didn't
have any reason to frisk him.

We'll submit it on that, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, both.

to do is to take a short recess.
rule right now.

What I'd like

I think I'm prepared to

I want to take a short recess, look at this

case then I'll come right back out.

Okay?

We'll be in

recess then for just a minute.
(A recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you both for waiting.

Let's wait for Mr. Naranjo.
(The defendant enters the courtroom.)
THE COURT:
back in court.

We have both attorneys and Mr. Naranjo

Here is my decision, folks.

interesting case.

It's an

Obviously much of this is new to me, not
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just this case but the law, too, so it!s more difficult than
it probably would be to somebody who's experienced, but here
is what Ifm going to rule:

ITm going to deny the motion to

suppress, and I'm going to do so for these reasons —

here's

what I find to be the most important facts to me in making
this decision:
First of all, we've got a known informant who
contacted —

who is a criminal justice professor who contacts

dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles
and gives a description of some clothing apparently.

Then

the dispatch relays that information on to the officer.

The

officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I
recall it, he sees a person who matches the description that
he's been given from the dispatch.

He gets into his police

car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding
his bike at that point.
He does do this —

what I think is really agreed upon —

Level I stop at a point by either honking his air or car
horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something to the
effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back
on his bike and pedals away.

He does pedal away in the

opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit unusual. And
the officer also notices a black object extending —
metallic object extending from the back pocket of
Mr. Naranjo.

a
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At that point —
point those facts.

it seems to me it's undisputed at that
Both sides seem to agree that those are

the fact at that point.
lights.

Then the officer turns on his

Itfs unclear at that point if he knew more than what

I!ve just recited or not, but to me that alone is
sufficient —

reasonable suspicion could be based on those

articulable facts alone in my mind.
At that point, when he turns on the light, his overhead
lights, it does seem to me that!s a Level II stop at that
point by turning those lights on.

He does —

and it?s

unclear whether he sees the bicycle down in the travel lane
on Dixon Drive whether that enters into his decision or not
in turning on the lights, that was unclear to me at least
from the transcript.
But itfs clear at around that same point in time when
he's turned on the lights that the defendant is approaching
the officer, the officer describes it as aggressive, that he
has an angry stare with him, he's yelling.

He goes to the

passenger side of the car, he sees Mr. Naranjo put his hand
in his front pocket and comes out with something and he's
concealing what that is from the officer's sight.
And then when the officer gets out and he's talking to
Mr. Naranjo, Mr. Naranjo is described as yelling at that
point.

He's asked to step around in front of the vehicle and

keep his hands in sight.

Mr. Naranjo disobeys that order
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from the officer by continuing past the front of the officer,
continues to come towards the officer and doesn!t show his
hands and is still in an aggressive manner and the officer
doesn't know the whereabouts of the metal object at that
point still.
The officer draws his weapon, puts it to his side of the
officer, again tells Mr. Naranjo to stop and to show the
officer his hands. Mr. Naranjo again disobeys that, that
order from the officer.

At that point, the officer then

points his weapon at Mr. Naranjo and he stops. And the
officer asked him what's in his hand and Mr. Naranjo responds
by yelling and being aggressive and throwing things,
scattering them around emptying his pockets, not throwing
things at the officer but scattering them around the area.
And the officer doesn't know what they are, he hasn't told
Mr. Naranjo to empty his pockets.

And then he orders

Mr. Naranjo to his knees and, again, Mr. Naranjo -- up to
this point he's disobeyed at least twice.

This time he

doesn't immediately obey but he does continue emptying his
pockets first before he then goes to his knees.
During the kind of the stand-up part of the frisk,
Mr. Naranjo tries to keep the officer from patting down his
front waistband and pocket area of his jeans and the officer
is still trying to see what's in hand.

And the officer

testifies that he couldn't bend over safely to pat the pant
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leg because he's holding Mr. Naranjofs handcuffed hands with
one hand and he canTt reach to his ankle area to pat down so
he lifts up his pant leg.

To me that seems reasonable and it

seems to be in conformity with what Terry is trying to do and
to avoid.

It seems to me that's reasonable given all of

these circumstances that I've just described.
For that reason, I find that the frisk is also
supportable by what the officer -- what he knew personally
and what he observed and his training and experience, I think
it is in conformance with the idea that backs up Terry.
And so that's my ruling and I'd ask that Ms. Neider
prepare the —

I suppose we need findings, conclusions, and

an order to that effect.
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:
on including the —

Yes, Judge.
Now is there any objection, Mr. Gravis,
I think Ms. Neider wanted the audiotape

included as part of the record?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Since it was referred to in the

transcript but I didn't see it there.
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, it was previously marked for

purposes of the prelim so it doesn't need to be remarked I
don't think.
THE COURT:

Just use it as the same exhibit number

then as in the prelim.

